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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Mr. Pendergrass appeals from a magistrate decision, and 
district court review, denying his motion to suppress evidence 
that he was driving on a suspended license and without proof of 
insurance. Specifically, Mr. Pendergrass argues that a traffic 
stop conducted by Garden City police violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights because the officer did not have a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that he was the driver of the vehicle 
immediately prior to the stop. First, Mr. Pendergrass argues 
tha:-: the magistrate court's conclusion was in error because it 
d not take into account whether the officer had been able to 
identi Mr. Pendergrass as the actual driver of the vehicle, as 
required by Idaho case law. Second, even if the court did take 
into account the officer's ability to identify the driver, the 
finding is clearly erroneous based on the video of the incident 
and testimony provided. 
B. Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On January 16, 2012, Officer Olsen of the Garden City 
Police Department initiated a traffic stop on a Toyota truck and 
subsequently cited the driver, defendant Kirk Pendergrass, for 
Driving Without Privileges and No Proof of Liability Insurance. 
Record, p. 115. Officer Olsen reported that he checked the 
license status of the registered owner and saw that the owner's 
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driving privileges were suspended. Id. Officer Olsen further 
reported that he was able to identify the driver of the Toyota 
truck as Mr. Pendergrass, the registered owner of the vehicle, 
by reviewing a photograph of Mr. Pendergrass while completing a 
corr,puteri license check. Id. The officer provided no 
specifics about what physical features he used to identify the 
driver of the vehicle. 
Testifying at a suppression hearing on June 18, 2012, 
Officer Olsen explained that he ran the registration at 4: 55 
P.M., and initiated the traffic stop at 5:05 P.M. after he had 
los sight of the vehicle for ten nutes. Transcript, pp. 17 
19. Officer Olsen could not recall where he first saw the 
vehicle er what the vehicle was doing at the time. Id. at 20. 
He testified, rather, 
vehicle's information, 
that ten minutes after running the 
he passed the vehicle again in a 
differenc location. Id. at 16, 19. Officer Olsen testified that 
he like identified Mr. Pendergrass at the time their vehicles 
passed each other while he still had a photo of Mr. Pendergrass 
open on his comDuter screen. Id. at 22. However, upon being 
pressed regarding when he identified Mr. Pendergrass as the 
driver, Officer Olsen admitted he could only offer a likely 
scenario, stating, "I can't say exactly how it happened. I can 
give you most likely, but that's all." Id. at 23. As such, 
Officer Olsen admitted that he had not identified Mr. 
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Pendergrass as the driver the first time he saw the vehicle, but 
"most likely 11 did so when he drove past Mr. Pendergrass ten 
minutes later. Id. at 21 23. 
Consist.ent with the video submitted into evidence at 
hearing, Mr. Pendergrass testified that, immediately before 
being pulled over by Officer Olsen, he passed the police 
vehicle, driving at approximacely 27 miles per hour. Id. at 28. 
He estimat that the police vehicle was driving in the opposite 
direction going between 25 and 3 0 miles per hour. Id. Mr. 
Pendergrass further testified that was wearing a 
"beanie ... sunglasses, and [a] big, bulky jacketn at the time of 
the incident. Id. at 26. 
Mr. Pendergrass filed a motion to suppress evidence, 
arguing Officer Olsen could not have developed a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that he was the driver of the vehicle 
during the split second as Officer Olsen passed his truck going 
in the opposite direction. At the hearing, both parties 
stipulated to the admission of Defense Exhibit A, a dashboard 
video of the traffic stop. Id. at 5. 
After reviewing the testimony, brief and video of the 
traffic stop, the magistrate court denied the motion to 
suppress. Record, p. 59. The magistrate court noted "Officer 
Olsen testified that when he passed Pendergrass' s Toyota truck 
heading in the opposite direction, he likely identified 
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Pendergrass as the driver and promptly initiated a traffic 
stop." Id. In its conclusion, the court ruled that "Olsen 
learned approximate 10 nutes before the traffic stop 
occurred that the Toyota was registered to Pendergrass and that 
Pendergrass's iv:i.ng pr leges were suspended. Thus was 
a valid reason for the stop." Id. 
On Ai__;gust 13, 2 012, Mr. Pendergrass entered a Conditional 
tten Guilty Plea, and subsequently filed a time appeal to 
the District Co'clrt. Id. at 62, 66. The District Court heard 
oral argument on February 20, 2013, and affirmed the 
magistrate's decision six days later. Id. at 114, 121. The 
District Court quoted the magistrate opinion finding that, 
"Olsen, who was driving westbound, identified Pendergrass as the 
driver of the Toyota truck, turned around, accelerated and 
stopped Pendergrass near the intersection of 47 th and Adams 
streets." Id. at 118. Not that the magistrate was in a 
better position to assess witness credibility, the District 
Court held that the magistrate "did take into consideration that 
Officer Olsen observed [Pendergrass] driving the vehicle and his 
finding is supported by substantial evidence, in the form of 
Officer Olsen's testimony." Id. at 119-120. The District Court 
also reviewed the video and disagreed with the appellant's 
assertion that "it was not possible for Officer Olsen to 
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identify Mr. Pendergrass, because of the speed of the vehicles.n 
Id. at 120. 
Mr. Pendergrass then filed a Notice of Appeal to the Idaho 
State Supreme Court. Id. at 123. 
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II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Officer have a reasonable, articulable 
suspicion the registered owner of the vehicle was 
the actual driver before initiating the traffic 
stop? 
2. Did the magistrate court err when it concluded 
the Officer, in fact, identified the 1\ppellant as 





dashboard video clearly do not 
ruling, and therefore should the 




Mr. Pendergrass contests the magistrate court's decision, 
and district court's review, denying his motion to suppress. 
Speci::ically, the defendant argues that the magistrate court's 
ru_J_ was in error because 't-l~ did not contemplate whether 
ficer Olsen had a reasonable, articulable suspi on that the 
unlicensed, registered owner was also the actual driver prior to 
initiating the stop as required by Idaho case law. kewise, 
' -F even i~ the magistrate concluded that Officer Olsen had a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the registered owner was 
driving the vehicle, the ruling is clearly erroneous because it 
is not supported by the testimony of the officer or the 
dashboard video provided in evidence. 
2. Standard of Review 
When reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, this 
Court accepts the trial court's findings of fact if they are 
supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews 
constitutional principles as applied to those findings. State 
v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648; 167 P.3d 783, 785 (Idaho Ct. App. 
2 006) . When reviewing the decision of a district court acting 
in its appellate capacity, this court "examine[s] the record of 
the trial court independently of, but with due regard for, the 
district court's intermediate appellate decision." Id. 
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3. This court should hold (a) the magistrate court's 
ruling does not meet the constitutional standard 
set in State v. Cerino because it does not 
address whether the officer had a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion the defendant was the 
driver of the vehicle, and (b) even if the 
magistrate did rule that the officer had 
reasonable, articulable suspicion, the finding is 
clearly erroneous because the officer's testimony 
and the dashboard video do not corroborate. 
This court should hold that the magistrate court erred by 
not taking into consideration whether Officer Olsen identified 
Mr. Pendergrass as the driver of the vehicle immediately prior 
to the stop, as required by Idaho case law. Further, even if 
the magistrate court's holding did take the identification into 
consideration, the finding is clearly erroneous because the 
officer admitted he could not state with certainty when he 
identified Mr. Pendergrass as the driver and the video shows he 
could not have identified Mr. Pendergrass in the short time it 
took to pass the vehicle driving in the opposite direction. 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. 
Amend. IV. A traffic stop is a seizure subject to the protection 
of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 
417 (1981). An officer must have a "reasonable and objective 
basis for suspecting that the vehicle or an occupant is involved 
in criminal activity" in order to lawfully tiate a traffic 
stop. State v. Cerino, 117 P.3d 876, 878 (Idaho Ct. App. 2005). 
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re must be "specific and articulable facts" that reasonably 
warra:cit the seizure, and the officer cannot base -che stop on 
"mere speculation or a hunch." Id. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held the mere knowledge that 
a registe owner of a vehicle is unlicensed is not sufficient 
cause to initiate a traffic stop. Id. at 878. The officer must 
also have specific knowledge that the unlicensed, registered 
owner is also the driver of the cleat the time of the stop. 
Id. In no, officers received an anonymous tip that a 
particular vehicle was transporting contraband. Id. 877. 
The officers ran a registration check of the vehicle and lear~ed 
t the defendant, one of the registered owners, did not have a 
valid Idaho license. Id. When one of the officers saw a man 
get in the vehicle and drive away, he requested that another 
officer stop t vehicle. Id. The Idaho Court of Appeals held 
that "the mere observation of a vehicle being driven by someone 
t same gender as the unlicensed owner is insufficient to give 
rise to a reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity. \\ Id. at 
878. The Court noted, if off ice rs could stop a vehicle based 
only on this knowledge, Officers could run owner registration 
and driver's license checks for any vehicle they see in 
operation, seeking an owner without an Idaho license and a 
driver of the same gender, and would be authorized to stop any 
vehicle 4- ' meeLing these criteria. In our judgment, the Fourth 
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Amendment safeguard requires more particularized suspicion to 
JUSti the "constitutionally cognizable intrusion" of stopping 
a motorist. Id. at 878. As outlined below, (a) because the 
magistrate court's decision does not take into consideration 
whether the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that 
the defendant was the actual driver of the vehicle, this court 
should hold that the ruling does not meet the constitutional 
standard set by Idaho case law. And, (b) even if the magistrate 
court did conclude that Officer Olsen had particular knowledge 
that the defendant was driving the vehicle, the ruling is 
clearly erroneous because it is not supported by the testimony 
or the dashboard video. 
A. This Court Should Overrule The Magistrate Court's 
Decision, And The District Court's Review, 
Because It Does Not Meet The Constitutional 
Standard Set By The Idaho Court Of Appeals In 
State v. Cerino Requiring A Reasonable, 
Articulable Suspicion That The Registered Owner 
Of The Vehicle Is The Actual Driver. 
Though the magistrate court acknowledges Officer Olsen 
testified that he "likely identified Pendergrass as the driver," 
the court does not appear to base the ruling on this testimony. 
Record, p. 59. Rather, the court cites cases from Washington, 
Utah and Minnesota to suggest that knowledge of a registered 
owner's suspension constitutes reasonable suspicion to initiate 
a traffic stop regardless of when the officer obtained that 
knowledge. See, Id. at 58. The magistrate court the ref ore 
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concludes, "Olsen learned approximately 10 minutes before the 
traffic stop occurred that the Toyota was registered to 
Pendergrass and that Pendergrass's driving privileges were 
SUSDended. Thus there was a valid reason for the traffic stop." 
Id. at 59. 
Nevertheless, the magistrate court erred by not taking 
Idaho case law into account that requires, in addition, the 
officer have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver 
is, in fact, the registered owner. See, Cerino, 11 7 P. 3d at 
878. Though the court acknowledges that the officer testified 
he "likely" identified the defendant wi a booking photo at the 
time they passed, the court did not rule whether this testimony 
was reliable or whether it is corroborated by the dashboard 
video. The court merely held that it was sufficient that 
Officer Olsen had knowledge that the registered owner was 
suspended. Because this holding does not meet the 
constitucional standard set by Cerino, this court should 
overrule the magistrate court's decision, and the district 
court's review, and grant the defendant's motion to suppress. 
B. Even If The Magistrate Court Concluded That The 
Officer Did, In Fact, Identify Mr. Pendergrass As 
The Actual Driver Of The Vehicle, This Ruling Is 
Clearly Erroneous Because It Is Not Corroborated 
By The Testimony Or The Dashboard Video. 
This court should still overrule the magistrate court's 
decision, and the district court review, even if it finds that 
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the lower court determined that Officer Olsen did identify the 
defendant as the driver prior to the stop, because this finding 
would clearly erroneous based on the testimony and dashboard 
video. As discussed above, Officer Olsen testified he 
identified Mr. Pendergrass through a booking photo he had called 
up on his in car computer. Record, p. 115. He testified that he 
"likely" idencified Mr. Pendergrass ten minutes after running 
his license plate when they passed each other. Trans t, at 
16, 19, 22. :Sowever, when pressed on the matter, Office:::- Olsen 
testified he "can't say exactly how it happened. I can give you 
most like but that's all." Id. at 23. Essentially, Officer 
Olsen testified that he was not sure how or where he identified 
Mr. Pendergrass as the actual driver. Rather, he testified to a 
"likely" scena::::-io that may or may not have happened. 
Because Officer Olsen could not testify with any certainty 
when, where or how he identified Mr. Pendergrass as the actual 
driver, even if the magistrate court concluded that he did so, 
the finding would be clearly erroneous. And, as evidenced by 
Mr. Pendergrass's testimony and the dashboard video, it is 
highly unlike that Officer Olsen could have identified the 
defendant as the driver with any particularity as required by 
case law. The vehicles passed each other at a significant rate 
of speed. Further, Mr. Pendergrass testified he was wearing a 
h ' ""eanie, sunglasses and bulky coat. Id. at 26. Officer Olsen 
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would have been unable to determine any of the defendant's 
specific features in that split second. It is far more likely 
that Officer Olsen knew the registered owner was suspended and 
had a very good "hunch" that the registered owner would be 
nd the wheel of Toyota truck. As such, this court 
should d, even if che magistrate court concluded that Officer 
Olsen ident fied the defendant with particularity as the driver 
prior to the stop, the finding is clearly erroneous when weighed 
against the testimony of the officer and the dashboard video. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
s co;i:i::-t should hold that the magistrate court's 
cision, and the district court's review, denying the 
fendant's motion to suppress, does not meet the constitutional 
standard set in State v. Cerino, because it does not contemplate 
whether the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that 
Mr. Pendergrass was the driver prior to initiating the stop. 
this court finds that the magistrate court did 
contemplate the identification as part of its decision, this 
courc should hold the finding is clearly erroneous because it is 
not corroborated by Officer Olsen's testimony or the dashboard 
v deo. Officer Olsen could not testify with certainty how or 
when he identified Mr. Pendergrass, but could only offer a 
"likely" SC 0. Officer Olsen almost certainly could not 
have identified Mr. Pendergrass with particularity in the split 
second as their vehicles passed. As such, this Court should 
the defendant's motion to suppress. 
Dated chis ll~h day of September, 2013. 
tf!Jt~~ 
AD C. KIMBALL 
Attorney for Appellant 
14 
V. CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, That on this 11th day of September, 2013, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the following, APPELLANT'S BRIEF, 
to: 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATEHOUSE, ROOM 210 
BOISE IDAHO 83720 
deposit the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
-~~ 
15 
